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terrorist attacks that came to characterize the American presence in the region.
This historical analysis builds up to the
political climax of the book. Echoing his previous work on American
foreign policy in the Middle East,
Vitalis gleefully dismantles the widely
accepted assertion that the Roosevelt
administration and the Saudi royal
family agreed to a nebulous “oil for
security” deal during World War II.
According to folklore—which Vitalis
skewers—the United States, ever since
those bygone days, has protected the
kingdom (including with deadly force)
in an explicit exchange for petroleum
access. Instead, Vitalis argues that
oil markets would function just fine
regardless of who holds the keys to
Abqaiq, Ras Tanura, and the rest of the
Saudi kingdom’s oil bounty. He asserts
that energy-security concerns are
employed misleadingly to justify the
perpetuation of this polarizing alliance,
about the merits of which he is deeply
skeptical. The author writes with
admiration for the similarly skeptical
scholars of the 1920s and 1970s who
challenged the conventional wisdom
about energy security as the basis for
foreign-policy decisions (particularly
in terms of military intervention).
Robert Vitalis makes bold and clear
claims. One wonders whether a mere
134 pages of text (before the acknowledgments and endnotes) are enough
to marshal the necessary evidence
and argumentation. He succeeds in
building his case, but the reader is
left wanting a bit more. The book
also is peppered with an unfortunate
and thoroughly unnecessary number
of typographical errors that detract
from the cutting prose and punchy
critiques of the existing literature.
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Although mentioned only in passing,
the twenty-first-century growth in
domestic U.S. oil production and
America’s rise to prominence as a
significant exporter of petroleum
already are prompting a reevaluation of
long-standing national-security policy.
Whether this reevaluation necessarily
entails a reduction in, realignment of,
or reckoning with respect to the nation’s
presence overseas is a contentious
proposition. Even asking the question is
enough to raise hackles in Washington,
where bureaucratic inertia enables the
circling of wagons with impressive
speed. The case studies that Vitalis
presents remind us that these debates are
not new. Readers may not agree with all
his conclusions—and certainly not with
every sarcastic remark he directs toward
other scholars—but the argument is
challenging, brisk, and unwavering. It
warrants close examination by regional
specialists and global strategists alike,
and, perhaps, a full-fledged rebuttal
from the alleged sorcerers of oilcraft.
TRISTAN ABBEY

A Brief Guide to Maritime Strategy, by James R.
Holmes. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press,
2019. 200 pages. $24.95.

Naval training, by necessity, is anchored
in developing technical and tactical
expertise quickly. All newly minted
officers preparing to serve on, above,
or below the surface of the ocean are
assimilating how-to skills. Demands on
their time do not diminish in their first
operational command, where training
continues and expectations increase.
In this busy and technology-heavy
environment, there often is little time
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left for philosophical or historical
discourse on big-picture topics. For this
reason, Professor Holmes, who holds the
J. C. Wylie Chair of Maritime Strategy
at the Naval War College, has written
A Brief Guide to Maritime Strategy to
expose young officers to the central
characters, foundational principles,
and key terms of maritime strategy.
Maritime Strategy is centered primarily on the writings of Alfred Thayer
Mahan, whose theories have influenced
American policy for more than a
century. Holmes begins by introducing
one of Mahan’s bedrock principles: “The
first law of states” is for a state’s own
“self-preservation” (p. 2). To accomplish
this task, the nation must be equipped
with the means of producing goods,
have the ability to ship those goods, and
then have access to foreign markets.
These three elements—production,
shipping, and markets—are the primary
ingredients of sea power. The major
content of the book is a primer on
how a nation generates, maintains,
and enforces sea power—the “saltwater
global supply chain” (p. 51).
Generating sea power has as much to
do with a nation’s physical qualities
as it does with human characteristics.
Geographical features play a central
role in whether a nation uses the sea
to its advantage. Countries such as
Great Britain and the United States are
fortunate in this regard, having easy
access to the sea and multiple ports
for shipping and receiving goods.
But other factors, such as national
character, are equally important. Does
the nation view itself as having a
“saltwater culture” (p. 38)? Does it
place value on ingenuity in producing
and shipping goods? Furthermore,
does the government promote
maritime industry through adequate
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laws and the financing needed to
maintain the shipping enterprise?
Maintaining the virtuous cycle of sea
power is the subject of the second part
of the book. Here, Holmes extrapolates
the need for commercial and naval
ports in strategic places throughout the
world. This chapter leads the reader on a
fascinating historical journey of Mahan’s
quest for better access to markets in East
Asia. Mahan’s influence was critical in
the development of the Panama Canal,
which he envisioned as the “gateway to
the Pacific” for American shipping (p. 68).
He also foresaw the importance
of the Hawaiian Islands as a “steppingstone” across the Pacific (p. 65).
The final chapter examines the particular role of a navy in the exercise of
national power—enforcement. America
strives to use the diplomatic process to
“win without fighting” whenever possible (p. 116). However, the U.S. Navy’s
crucial role is to serve as a “backstop for
diplomatic efforts” in the quest to “open,
nourish, and safeguard commercial
access to important trading theaters such
as East Asia and Western Europe” (p. 2).
Maritime Strategy is excellently written.
In an accessible and nonthreatening
way, it introduces the reader to critical
topics addressed by major theorists.
Comprising only three chapters and a
total of 150 pages, it easily can be read
in a short time. Two items are especially
noteworthy. First, Holmes’s analogy of
the sea as a maritime commons—a vast
marketplace where goods are bought
and sold—is memorable and apt. Unlike
the commons of colonial New England,
though, where the local town enforced
the rules of trade, there is no sovereign
over the sea. For this reason, nations
must work together to enforce the law
of the sea to ensure maritime freedom.
A second item worth mentioning is
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the sea’s ability to link us back to our
forebears. As Professor Holmes states,
“Seafarers join something larger and
older when they go down to the sea
in ships” (p. 14). Not only does the
sea connect us as a global community,
but it also has the ability to connect
us with our past and with our naval
and military history and heritage.
Wardrooms and classrooms would do
well to add Maritime Strategy to their list
of books to discuss. Training commands
should consider including this book
in their curricula for new accessions,
as it provides a big-picture view of the
Navy’s place on the national scene.
SCOTT CAUBLE

Coalition of the UnWilling and UnAble: European
Realignment and the Future of American Geopolitics, by John R. Deni. Ann Arbor: Univ. of Michigan Press, 2021. 274 pages. $75.

In this exceptional and contemporary
analysis, John R. Deni provides a
sobering view of the largest U.S.
European military allies and their
abilities to function as effective partners.
In short, the current and future pictures
are not pretty. As the book’s title
indicates, whether one considers the
United Kingdom, France, Germany,
Italy, or Poland, these states suffer from
considerable—arguably profound—military limitations that will circumscribe
their ability to serve as military partners
to the United States. Likewise, whether
one focuses on demographics (declining
birth rates), national economies that
cannot support military ambitions,
the absence of advanced military
capabilities, or strategic directions
that do not square well with those of
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the United States, the applicability
to these allies of all these factors, to
varying degrees, helps to explain how
significant the barriers in place are.
Certainly, previous scholarship has
examined European military shortcomings. Many have written on American
military preeminence in NATO’s
operation in Kosovo; others have
demonstrated the different strategic
perspectives and European military limitations apparent in NATO’s bombings in
Libya. Deni provides an updated analysis
that looks closely at the historical “big
four” European allies, plus Poland.
For the United Kingdom, Deni
notes that over the last decade major
reductions in defense expenditures
have cut deeply into British military
capabilities. He also devotes much
analysis to the British economy,
noting that Brexit similarly will cut
deeply into Britain’s tax base, effectively
preventing the British from investing
in their military forces, even if they
had the political desire to do so.
The author’s contrasting analysis of
Germany is especially perceptive and
revealing. He makes the case that the
Germans’ strong and robust economy,
favorable labor market, and budget
surpluses provide the potential for them
to play a far more significant role in
global security. The German public,
however, remains generally opposed
to the projection of German military
force; opinion polls even indicate that
Germans are among the least likely,
compared with respondents from other
European allies, to express a willingness
to use force to defend another NATO
ally if it got into a “serious military
conflict” with Russia (p. 72). Politicalelite and youth opinions differ on this
point, yet the dominant norm remains
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